The debate on Scottish parliamentary reform, 1830-1832 by Pentland, Gordon
  
 
 
 
Edinburgh Research Explorer 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The debate on Scottish parliamentary reform, 1830-1832
Citation for published version:
Pentland, G 2006, 'The debate on Scottish parliamentary reform, 1830-1832' Scottish Historical Review, vol.
85, no. 1, pp. 100-130. DOI: 10.1353/shr.2006.0025
Digital Object Identifier (DOI):
10.1353/shr.2006.0025
Link:
Link to publication record in Edinburgh Research Explorer
Document Version:
Peer reviewed version
Published In:
Scottish Historical Review
Publisher Rights Statement:
© Pentland, G. (2006). The debate on Scottish parliamentary reform, 1830-1832. Scottish Historical Review,
85(1), 100-130doi: 10.1353/shr.2006.0025
General rights
Copyright for the publications made accessible via the Edinburgh Research Explorer is retained by the author(s)
and / or other copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing these publications that users recognise and
abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
Take down policy
The University of Edinburgh has made every reasonable effort to ensure that Edinburgh Research Explorer
content complies with UK legislation. If you believe that the public display of this file breaches copyright please
contact openaccess@ed.ac.uk providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and
investigate your claim.
Download date: 05. Apr. 2019
G O R D O N P E N T L A N D
The Debate on Scottish Parliamentary
Reform, 1830-1832
Abstract
The voluminous historiography of the ‘Great Reform Act’ of 1832 and the
more modest historiography of the Reform Act (Scotland) have tended to
focus on how far the legislation effected a break with an aristocratic consti-
tution. What this approach does little to illuminate, however, is the extent
to which the reform legislation was framed and debated as a renegotiation
of the relationship between England and Wales, Scotland, Ireland and the
Empire. In Scotland, this meant that the extensive debate on reform
tended to revolve around different interpretations of the Union of 1707
and Scotland’s subsequent history and development. This article explores
the reform debate among Scotland’s political elite and, in particular, how
the issue was tackled in Parliament. It demonstrates that in the fluid
context provided by the developing constitutional crisis after 1829 simple
divisions of ‘Whig’ and ‘Tory’ and even ‘Reformer’ and ‘Anti-reformer’
do not adequately describe the range of positions taken on the question of
reform. The need to respond to the arguments of parliamentary oppo-
nents and to fast-moving events outside of Parliament ensured that
responses to reform tended to be idiosyncratic. This article argues that the
combination of the nature of reform as a renegotiation of the Union and
the need to appeal to those outside of Parliament saw the reform debate
prosecuted as a contest over the language of patriotism. Both sponsors
and opponents of reform claimed to represent the voice of ‘the nation’,
but this contest was far more complex than a straightforward confronta-
tion between Anglophile ‘assimilationists’ and defenders of Scottish
‘semi-independence’.
Those historians who have attempted complete accounts of Britain’s
crisis of reform have instinctively referred to the debate and controversy
that surrounded the passing of the ‘Great Reform Act’ between 1830
and 1832, and have made only fleeting reference to the other two
Reform Acts which were passed in 1832 to restructure the parliamentary
representation of Ireland and Scotland.1 In one sense such omission is
perfectly reasonable, given that the main parliamentary battleground
was, indeed, the measure for England and Wales. This was especially
true after the government’s intention to pilot all three bills through
GORDON PENTLAND is postdoctoral research fellow in the School of History and Classics at
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1 The standard account is still Michael Brock, The Great Reform Act (London, 1973); see
also Edward Pearce, Reform! The Fight for the 1832 Reform Act (London, 2003).
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Parliament simultaneously was rendered impractical by the amendment
moved by General Gascoyne in April 1831. This attacked the govern-
ment’s proposed redistribution of parliamentary seats and called for no
reduction to be made to the English representation in Parliament, a
move that was explicitly designed ‘to prevent the aggrandizement of the
Irish and Scotch, at the expense of the English representation’.2
Historiographical debate on the reform measures has tended to
revolve around the issue of whether they represented, or were intended
as, a decisive break with an aristocratic constitution or a carefully engi-
neered adjustment, which left much of the old system, and in Scotland
its most obnoxious features, intact.3 Gascoyne’s amendment might thus
be seen as an obstructionist tactic of inveterate anti-reformers,
self-interestedly seeking to preserve the unreformed system. The
amendment and the lengthy exchanges that followed it do, however,
highlight another major area of the reform debate. The measures were
debated throughout as a renegotiation of the British constitution and a
rebalancing, or indeed unbalancing, of the political relationships
between England and Wales, Scotland, Ireland and the Empire.4 This
was an area of contention which government had to consider very seri-
ously as it attempted to legislate effectively for the multiple union. While
ministers remained committed to increasing the representation of Scot-
land and Ireland, this could not be done to too great a degree, especially
in Ireland, without losing votes in the Commons. Scottish and Irish
votes, however, were important, and so the architects of reform had to
steer between the Scylla of what the Lord Advocate saw as a selfish ‘Eng-
lish nationality’ and the Charybdis identified by Lord Holland in a
potential ‘combination of Irish and Scotch reformers and the
antireformers’.5 It is partly with a view to illuminating some of these ‘na-
tional’ aspects of the reform question, that this article will investigate the
debate on the Reform Bills for Scotland between 1830 and 1832.
It was a measure of the low priority given to the Scottish reform bill
that Lord Althorp, the Chancellor of the Exchequer and leader of the
House of Commons, could consider Scotland in just one line in the plan
he submitted to the committee of reform in December 1830: ‘Give Scot-
land a Representative Government.’6 The reform bill for England and
D E B A T E O N S C O T T I S H P A R L I A M E N T A R Y R E F O R M , 1 8 3 0 - 1 8 3 2 1 0 1
2 Parliamentary Debates [Parl. Debs.], 3rd ser., iii, 1528.
3 The English historiography is ably surveyed in Philip Salmon, Electoral Reform at Work:
Local Politics and National Parties, 1832-1841 (Woodbridge, 2002), 3-11; for Scotland
see William Ferguson, ‘The Reform Act (Scotland) of 1832: Intention and Effect’,
SHR 45 (1966) 105-114; Michael Dyer, Men of Property and Intelligence: The Scottish Elec-
toral System Prior to 1884 (Aberdeen, 1996), 23-68.
4 For the neglected imperial dimension to the reform debates see Miles Taylor, ‘Empire
and Parliamentary Reform: The 1832 Reform Act Revisited’ in Arthur Burns and
Joanna Innes (eds), Rethinking the Age of Reform: Britain 1780-1850 (Cambridge, 2003),
295-311.
5 Edinburgh, National Library of Scotland [NLS], Advocates’ Manuscripts [Adv. MSS],
9.1.8, fo. 77, Francis Jeffrey to Henry Cockburn, 5 Sept. 1831; Abraham D. Kriegel
(ed.), The Holland House Diaries 1831-40 (London, 1977), 58.
6 Durham University Library [DUL], Grey Papers, GRE/B46/1/29, Lord Althorp’s
Plan of Reform.
Wales remained the principal battleground throughout the reform
debates, while the need to legislate sensitively for Ireland, still danger-
ously divided after the Wellington administration’s passing of Catholic
Emancipation in 1829, made her representative arrangements second
priority. Although Sir James Graham, the First Lord of the Admiralty,
took some responsibility for Scottish reform, it fell to the Scottish law
officers, Francis Jeffrey, the Lord Advocate, and Henry Cockburn, the
Solicitor-General, to draft the measure. Jeffrey, relying on the support of
a handful of other Scottish MPs, undertook to prosecute the measure in
Parliament. In doing so, he pitted himself against Scottish MPs who
remained, of all the national groupings, the most consistently opposed
to reform.7
The approaches to reform among Scottish political elites defy easy
categorisation. There were broad areas of agreement, but it is difficult to
identify coherent Whig and Tory positions on the reform bills. One
alternative would be to follow a division that was identified by contempo-
raries: ‘It was no longer Whig and Tory: It was Reformer and
Anti-reformer.’8 Even such non-party labels as pro- and anti-reform,
however, prove inadequate in a fluid context where what was often
debated was not whether there ought to be reform, but rather to what
extent and along what lines it ought to be carried. Certainly, distinct the-
oretical approaches can be glimpsed, more especially in the printed
texts produced by some members of Scotland’s political elites and the
rival periodicals, Blackwood’s and the Edinburgh Review. In debate,
however, the need to respond to the arguments of opponents and to
events outside Parliament meant that the responses of most MPs were
idiosyncratic.9
This pressing need to respond to events outside Parliament suggests
that high politics cannot be seen as an isolated practice, impervious to
what was happening ‘out of doors’.10 MPs were speaking not only to their
immediate parliamentary audience but also to a large popular move-
ment that demanded reform. Alexander Somerville, working as a gar-
dener’s labourer during the debates on the first and second readings of
the English reform bill, attested to the extra-parliamentary interest in
what MPs actually said: ‘The speeches were perused with intense inter-
est, even in such places so socially remote as our bothy’.11 When the duke
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7 For how different national groups of MPs voted on the reform bills see Gordon Pent-
land, ‘Radicalism and Reform in Scotland, 1820-1833’ unpublished Ph.D. thesis (Uni-
versity of Edinburgh, 2004), 291.
8 Rusticus, Letter to the Right Hon. Earl of Minto (Edinburgh, 1831), 5.
9 Mark O’Neill and Ged Martin, ‘A Backbencher on Parliamentary Reform, 1831-1832’,
Historical Journal, 23 (1980) 539-63.
10 For arguments for a cohesive political culture in Britain and for the influence of the
English Political Unions on Parliament see Peter Jupp, British Politics on the Eve of
Reform: The Duke of Wellington’s Administration, 1828-30 (London, 1998); Nancy D.
LoPatin, Political Unions, Popular Politics and the Great Reform Act of 1832 (London,
1999).
11 Alexander Somerville, The Autobiography of a Working Man (London, 1848: reprint,
1951), 91.
of Buccleuch made what reformers believed were false representations
of their motives, he received detailed refutations of his speeches in the
post.12 There was thus a good deal of interaction between Parliament
and the popular movement for reform. Just as the actions and argu-
ments of the popular reform movement could be materially affected by
what was said and done in Parliament, so could the speeches and votes of
MPs be influenced by experience or perceptions of what was happening
outside of Westminster.
With this large reform movement in Scotland claiming to represent
the voice of ‘the nation’, and a reform measure that sought a fundamen-
tal change in Scotland’s position within Britain, both reformers and
anti-reformers attempted to capture the language of patriotism. This
aspect of the reform question ought to be seen in the context of wider
historiographical debate. George Davie’s monumental The Democratic
Intellect, in attributing to the anglicisation of Scottish universities in the
nineteenth century a destructive impact on Scottish culture and institu-
tions, identified a dynamic that seems applicable to the Whig reforms of
1832.13 Nicholas Phillipson’s work on the reform of the Court of Session
is, however, more valuable in exploring this aspect of the reform debate.
The fundamental remodelling of the Court, an immobile Scottish insti-
tution protected by powerful vested interests and the Union settlement,
provides a close analogy for the issue of Scottish parliamentary reform.
The reform aimed at, which had a long lineage but was only completed
in 1830, was to introduce trial by jury into the ordinary forms of the
Court of Session. Such a reform might be viewed as a clear case of assimi-
lation, straightforwardly giving to Scotland the benefits of a
much-vaunted English liberty. Philllipson, however, examined the con-
tested nature of this process, whereby both Whigs and Tories might
oppose the reform if it were not seen to be in the best interests of Scot-
land, though many found they could do so only through ‘an ideology of
noisy inaction’, which might accept the inevitability of assimilation, but
remained concerned about its impact on Scottish society and institu-
tions.14 The language of patriotism was similarly contested in the consid-
eration of parliamentary reform, and no party achieved a monopoly on
its use. Just as simple categories of pro- and anti-reform only inade-
quately reflect the complexity of debate, so too do notions of a bi-polar
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12 Edinburgh, National Archives of Scotland [NAS], Buccleuch Muniments, GD224/
507/32, David Brown to the duke of Buccleuch, 20 April 1831.
13 George Elder Davie, The Democratic Intellect: Scotland and her Universities in the Nineteenth
Century (Edinburgh, 1961). A similar interpretation of Scottish politics, where a patri-
otic pre-1832 governing class offering effectual government is contrasted with the
‘ruthless anglicisation’ of the Whigs, is offered in Michael Fry, The Dundas Despotism
(Edinburgh, 1992), 379-84.
14 Nicholas Phillipson, The Scottish Whigs and the Reform of the Court of Session, 1785-1830
(Edinburgh, 1990); Nicholas Phillipson, ‘Nationalism and Ideology’ in J. N. Wolfe
(ed.), Government and Nationalism in Scotland: An Enquiry by the Members of the University
of Edinburgh (Edinburgh, 1969), 167-188. Davie’s Anglicisation thesis has also been
convincingly questioned in subsequent work on Scottish education, especially R. D.
Anderson, Education and Opportunity in Victorian Scotland (Oxford, 1983), 358-61.
confrontation between Anglophile ‘assimilationists’ and defenders of
Scottish ‘semi-independence’ oversimplify this particular aspect of it.15
This article will therefore consider parliamentary reform as it was
debated in Parliament and in the ranks of the Scottish political elite. The
principal Scottish debates on parliamentary reform occurred on the
introduction of the three successive Scottish reform bills. Lord John
Russell’s introduction of the government plan of reform on 1 March
1831 was followed on 9 March by his asking leave to bring in the Scottish
bill.16 Following the government’s defeat on Gascoyne’s amendment,
and the subsequent general election, the next major debate followed
the reintroduction of the bill, when Jeffrey moved a second reading on
23 September.17 The final major debates took place on Jeffrey asking
leave to bring in another bill in January 1832, after the rejection of the
English bill by the House of Lords in October, and on its second reading
in May.18 Over this two-year period, however, Scottish reform was
debated constantly. The political elite avidly followed the progress of the
various bills in the press, and last ditch amendments or clauses could
quickly stimulate debate. These less publicised issues provided fora for
the discussion going on among Scotland’s political elite.
*
In the first instance, it is important to realise that what MPs debated was
the reform of a representative system that was peculiar to Scotland.
While the Act of Union had determined that Scotland would return
forty-five representatives to the House of Commons, it had left the fran-
chise and other electoral machinery largely untouched. This system had
ensured that, by 1830, Scotland’s whole electorate was probably less than
4,500 in a population of 2,300,000.19 The reform critique focused on the
system that produced this narrow electorate, and highlighted two princi-
pal grievances. First, it condemned the county franchise, which was
based largely on a statute of 1681 and had been increasingly open to
abuse. In particular, the creation of ‘fictitious’ or ‘faggot’ votes on the
qualification provided by the feudal superiority over land rather than
ownership of the land itself, was condemned as a practice that led to aris-
tocratic domination and illegitimate influence.20 Second, it highlighted
the oligarchic system of municipal government, whereby sitting town
councils elected their own successors on the authority of a statute of
1469. If this was seen as a recipe for corruption and mismanagement in
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15 Lindsay Paterson, The Autonomy of Modern Scotland (Edinburgh, 1994), 46-72.
16 For the major Scottish contributions to these debates see Parl. Debs., 3rd ser., ii,
1144-60, 1182-7, iii, 59-81, 125-43, 317-25.
17 Ibid., vii, 527-80.
18 Ibid., ix, 632-45, xii, 1175-1209.
19 Norman Gash, Politics in the Age of Peel: A Study in the Technique of Parliamentary Represen-
tation 1830-1850 (London, 1953), 36.
20 For the representative system in the Scottish counties see William Ferguson, ‘The Elec-
toral System in the Scottish Counties before 1832’, Stair Society Miscellany, 2 (1984)
261-94.
local government the fact that these councils, grouped together in dis-
tricts of burghs, also returned Scotland’s burgh MPs meant that munici-
pal and parliamentary reform in the Scottish context were but two sides
of the same coin.21 A final point to make about the Scottish franchises
and electorate is that in their narrowness they stood in marked contrast
to those in Ireland and England. There were, of course, serious reform
arguments that applied to the representative system throughout the
United Kingdom, but there was broad agreement that unique features
in Scotland’s representation made it the very worst component of this
system. Indeed, by December of 1831, Lord Holland was convinced that
even the most extreme English anti-reformers would concede reform in
Scotland ‘for the old system there is admitted to be too preposterous to
be defended’.22 The peculiarities of Scotland’s system would thus
become a key battleground in the arguments between reformers and
anti-reformers.
Indeed, the narrowness of the Scottish system meant that the major-
ity of Scottish MPs had little to gain from parliamentary reform, and
they remained the most trenchant opponents of the government’s leg-
islation. In England, as D. C. Moore has demonstrated, the forty shilling
freeholder franchise in the counties had increasingly allowed voters
from urban areas without separate representation to undermine the
landed interest in industrial counties.23 English reform might, there-
fore, garner support from landholders who would welcome redistribu-
tion plans that would remove this urban influence from the county
representation. In Scotland, a restrictive franchise ensured that neither
county nor burgh MPs were exposed to such pressures and, conse-
quently, could oppose reform as being materially against their own
interests.24 They were, of course, exposed to the pressure of public
opinion, which, if it could not exert much direct electoral influence,
might affect the opinions of both electors and elected indirectly.
Although a majority of Scottish MPs, particularly before the general
election of 1831, voted consistently against the government bills, few
were willing to take to their feet and explain their opposition to Scot-
tish reform in the initial debates. Even fewer were prepared, following
the public reaction that had vilified the duke of Wellington and William
Dundas, the MP for Edinburgh, to declare against the necessity of any
reform.
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21 For the representative system in the Scottish Burghs see Michael Dyer, ‘Burgh Districts
and the Representation of Scotland, 1707-1983’, Parliamentary History 15 (1996)
287-307; D. W. Hayton (ed.), The History of Parliament: the House of Commons, 1690-1715,
(5 vols, Cambridge, 2002), i, 161-77; Edward Porrit, The Unreformed House of Commons:
Parliamentary Representation before 1832 (2 vols, Cambridge, 1903), ii, 115-42.
22 NLS, Correspondence of J. A. Murray, MS 19735, fo. 65, Lord Holland to J. A. Murray,
14 Dec. 1831.
23 D. C. Moore, ‘Concession or Cure: The Sociological Premises of the First Reform Act’,
Historical Journal 9 (1966) 39-59.
24 For the representative system in the Scottish counties see Ferguson, ‘The electoral
system in the Scottish counties before 1832’, 261-94.
Those who opposed reform certainly could not do so with the confi-
dence they had during the 1820s and earlier. Although we should not
overemphasise the transformative effect of the period, the idea that par-
liamentary reform in Scotland could be opposed by invoking the inviola-
bility of the Union settlement had taken a decisive beating. Though
reformers had consistently argued that the abolition of heritable juris-
dictions in 1747 had decisively proved the mutability of the settlement,
the constitutional changes effected by the repeal of the Test and Corpo-
ration Acts in 1828 and particularly the concession of Catholic Emanci-
pation the following year, demonstrated the power of the Parliament to
amend the terms of the Union.25 This certainly had an impact on some
Scottish members, who had to abandon or reconfigure arguments that
they had levelled against political reform before 1828. Sir George Clerk,
the MP for the county of Edinburgh, had argued against Lord Archibald
Hamilton’s motion to amend the Scottish county representation in 1823
that the terms of the Union utterly forbade such a measure, but had to
concede by 1831 that ‘the change proposed was within the power of Par-
liament’.26
In any case, constitutional immutability had never been the principal
argument deployed against reform, and those who opposed it more
often rested their claims on a more nuanced and flexible interpretation
of the constitution. In 1831 those who opposed reform, as they had done
in the 1820s, tended to appeal to Burkean notions of an essentially pre-
scriptive constitution. This argument had important common and
natural law antecedents and posited a constitution which had proved
itself ideally suited to the practical needs of the people and had evolved
over time, amended by the experience of generations.27 The argument
was decisively stated in the context of the French Revolution, and could
provide a definitive case against the pursuit of the kind of ‘speculative’
reform that had characterised the proceedings of the revolutionaries
and had found a popular audience in Britain through the writings of
Thomas Paine. Burke had sought to establish that the experience of gen-
erations, which had amended practical abuses as they became apparent
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25 This absolute parliamentary sovereignty in some ways remained, of course, ambiguous
and contested, as the Ten Years’ Conflict and the Disruption of the Church of Scot-
land would demonstrate after 1833; see Michael Fry, ‘The Disruption and the Union’
in Stewart J. Brown and Michael Fry (eds), Scotland in the Age of Disruption (Edinburgh,
1993), 31-43; H. T. Dickinson, ‘The Ideological Debate on the British Constitution in
the Late Eighteenth and Early Nineteenth Centuries’ in Andrea Romano (ed.), Il
Modello Costituzionale Inglese e la sua Recezione nell’area Mediterranea tra la fine del 700 e la
prima metà dell ’800 (Milan, 1998), 166-77.
26 Parl. Debs., 2nd ser., ix, 623 and 3rd ser., iii, 126. Sir George Clerk (1787-1867) was MP
for the county of Edinburgh 1811-32 and then again 1835-7 and was connected to the
Dundas interest. He was a lord of the admiralty 1819-27 and 1828-30 and
under-secretary for the Home department in the last few months of Wellington’s
administration.
27 J. G. A. Pocock, ‘Burke and the Ancient Constitution: A Problem in the History of
Ideas’, Historical Journal 3 (1960) 125-43; Paul Lucas, ‘On Edmund Burke’s Doctrine of
Prescription: Or, an Appeal from the New to the Old Lawyers’, Historical Journal 11
(1968) 35-63.
and produced the constitution in its present form, had to be preferred
to the theoretical approach of individuals or single generations.28
Such arguments were still the meat and drink of much political
debate, and those who opposed the bill consistently represented it as a
‘speculative’ or ‘theoretical’ measure, and sought to highlight the mani-
fold dangers of adopting such an approach to Britain’s political institu-
tions.29 The argument had more force in the Scottish context, where
reformers had long pointed to the total insufficiency of Scottish repre-
sentation and the consequent need for its complete reform. This suspi-
cion of theory was perhaps bolstered by the involvement of the Scottish
bill’s architects, Francis Jeffrey, the Lord Advocate, and Henry
Cockburn, the Solicitor-General, in political economy through the Edin-
burgh Review. Furthermore, in Parliament, prominent Scots like Jeffrey
and Sir James Mackintosh, pressed the point that while the notion of
‘restoration’ was applicable to the English context, it certainly could not
be used in reference to Scotland, where a total absence of popular repre-
sentation meant that political arrangements essentially had to be
devised from scratch. Anti-reformers seized on such arguments and lost
no opportunity to point out the dangers of such an approach. Sir
George Murray, MP for Perthshire, explained his continued opposition
to the bill in September 1831 by suggesting that while the English bill
certainly made great changes to her ancient institutions ‘the Scotch Bill
went far beyond that, as it completely overturned and destroyed the
system of Representation which had existed in that portion of the
empire both before and subsequent to the Union’.30 The ministers were
examples of men who ‘looked not to practical good through experience,
but to theoretical good through speculation’, and the House need only
look so far as France for an example of the turmoil that came with ‘de-
stroying the ancient institutions, and of overturning the social edifices
that had existed for generations’.31
Members who opposed the bills frequently invoked the spectre of the
French Revolution to oppose the speculative reform of Britain’s institu-
tions. Lord Francis Leveson Gower, MP for Sutherland, claimed to
remember the anarchy caused by the French Revolution and was
alarmed by the open display in Britain of the tricolour flag ‘the emblem
and forerunner of revolution in other countries’.32 All MPs operated
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28 Edmund Burke, Reflections on the Revolution in France (London, 1790); H. T. Dickinson,
Liberty and Property: Political Ideology in Eighteenth-Century Britain (London, 1977),
270-318.
29 It was a common trope in criticism of the Whigs that ‘they followed abstract principle,
without regarding other considerations’; ‘Parties’, Blackwood’s Edinburgh Magazine
[Blackwood’s] 28 (1830) 90.
30 Parl. Debs., 3rd ser., vii, 566. Sir George Murray (1772-1846) had been an officer
during the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars and served as Wellington’s
quartermaster-general in the Peninsula 1809-14. He sat for Perthshire in the Dundas
interest 1824-32 and held various offices during his career, most notably as colonial
secretary under Wellington 1828-30.
31 Ibid., 571-2.
32 Ibid., ii, 1150.
within the ideological context bequeathed by the French Revolution,
and the lesson emphasised by those who opposed reform was that taught
by Burke—speculative reform led to revolution. Indeed, for Lord
Gower, the two were inseparable, and he eulogised the memory of men
like Pitt, Windham and Canning who ‘boldly placed themselves between
the Constitution and that dreaded plague, Reform, which was but
another word for revolution’.33 Such assertions were doubtless given
extra force by the continuing instability of Europe after another, albeit
more moderate, revolution in France had overthrown Charles X in the
‘glorious three days’ of July 1830. This tendency of the opponents of
reform to interpret domestic politics in a European context, and partic-
ularly through the prism of the 1790s, was given sustained expression in
the series of thirteen articles ‘On Parliamentary Reform and the French
Revolution’ penned by Archibald Alison for Blackwood’s.34 It was not only
the opponents of reform, of course, who believed that Continental
events were relevant to domestic reform, and the government too was
anxiously following events in France. In January 1832, perhaps with the
revolt of the Lyon silk-workers in November 1831 in mind, Jeffrey
informed Cockburn: ‘I am sure we are very uneasy at the ticklish state of
things in France. If monarchy is again cast down there, there will be war
and revolution all over the continent.’35
If opponents of reform had largely retreated from an argument based
on the inviolability of the provisions of the Union, they were not
deprived of the ability to portray themselves as patriotic defenders of
Scotland’s peculiar position since 1707. The predisposition to value
experience over theory provided opponents of the bill with their most
frequently employed arguments. It allowed for the defence of irregular-
ity and the apparently haphazard nature of Britain’s representative
system, which, nevertheless, perfectly represented all interests. In
looking back to the reform crisis, and reflecting on the results of the leg-
islation, Archibald Alison recalled the predictions he had made at the
time and which he now believed had been confirmed:
[…] the Reform Bill would destroy the virtual representation of the colo-
nies, which had grown up with the purchase of the close boroughs by colo-
nial wealth; close the avenue by which the highest and most disinterested
talent had hitherto obtained an entrance into the Legislature; vest
supreme political power in a single class […] to the exclusion of the varied
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34 [Archibald Alison], ‘On Parliamentary Reform and the French Revolution [nos.
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interest which had hitherto divided the powers and attracted the attention
of Government from all the different quarters of the empire.36
It was by a similar argument that the singularity of Scotland’s arrange-
ments could be justified in Parliament. It was a defence of Scotland’s
semi-independence since the Union, but one premised on the practical
results of this arrangement, rather than on simple invocations of its
immutability. One manner in which this had been done before 1830 was
to maintain that the British system could only be appreciated when
viewed in its entirety. Lord Binning had used this argument to justify his
opposition to James Abercromby’s motion to amend the representation
of Edinburgh in 1824.37 This position had, however, been undermined
by the Wellington administration’s disfranchisement of some 200,000
Irish forty-shilling freeholders as a security for the passing of Catholic
Emancipation in 1829. The argument was still voiced throughout the
reform crisis, and Alison defended the existing system by pointing to the
constitutional balance maintained by the ‘popular’ and ‘aristocratic’
interests being predominant in different parts of the country: ‘Cornwall
and Scotland are the great fortresses of the aristocratic; London and the
manufacturing districts, of the democratic factions.’38 By October 1831,
however, Lord Binning, now the earl of Haddington and sitting in the
Lords, was compelled to follow the logic of his own earlier position.
Though he still opposed the government’s bill, he was convinced of the
necessity of political reform in Scotland, which he had only resisted
before on the basis that ‘it would be impossible to introduce it without its
being followed by a Reform of the Representation in England’.39 Now
that it was proposed to alter the representation in all three kingdoms, an
argument that sought the maintenance of Scottish singularity as a check
on political arrangements elsewhere was unsustainable.
In fact, the principal argument against reform of Scotland’s represen-
tation, though still deriving from the notion of a prescriptive constitu-
tion, rested on less well-defined notions of the singularity of Scotland,
her people and her institutions. It was delivered by Lord Gower during
the debate on the English reform bill and formed the first defence of
Scotland’s representation. Certainly, he argued, were one to suggest a
change in Scotland’s parliamentary representation to the shade of
Fletcher of Saltoun, ‘the last of Scotchmen’, he might recount the politi-
cal and religious partisanship, the oppression of the lower orders and
the corruption of his own day. Fletcher, or any noble-minded contempo-
rary of his, claimed Gower, would doubtless assent to such political
reform.40 Gower then considered the present state of Scotland and,
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seeking to subvert Whig reform arguments, he cannily took his evidence
from an influential pro-reform article by Henry Cockburn, which had
appeared in the Edinburgh Review in October 1830. The article, while
lamenting the lack of political representation, painted a rosy picture of
the state of Scottish society, and Gower cited word for word Cockburn’s
praise of the general education and peacefulness of Scotland’s rapidly
increasing population and her ‘generally diffused wealth’.41
By this argument, what was important was not the theory behind Scot-
land’s political arrangements, but the results they produced. These
were, in post-Union Scotland’s case, an enviable level of material pros-
perity and civilisation. This defence was one premised on the singularity
of Scotland’s position after 1707, retaining peculiar institutions and an
increasingly educated people who, however, sensibly avoided claiming
abstract political rights and, according to Lord Stormont, ‘preferred
peace to revolution; they wanted to have their ancient institutions pre-
served to them, and they wanted to be left alone. In short, they preferred
their own institutions, founded on practice to any the noble lord could
offer them founded on theory.’42 It was a patriotic argument that cele-
brated Scotland’s progress since 1707, but which sought to defend its
chartered rights and institutions as then secured. This argument could
attribute Scotland’s present advanced position not to the effects of the
Union and the reflected freedom and ‘intrinsic excellence of the
English constitution’, but rather to Scotland’s own peculiar institutions
and historical development.43 Thus, for Alison, Scotland’s progress did
derive from a ‘long and unparalleled series of beneficent legislation’ but
the origins of this were in the period before 1707: ‘All the great founda-
tions of public prosperity […] were laid by the Scottish legislature prior
to the English Union.’44 The Union had indeed brought good govern-
ment, but it was good government only because it left Scotland alone to
flourish under its own excellent institutions.45 When reformers were
believed to be indifferent to the peculiar arrangements that had pro-
duced such results, arguments could be made that were nationalistic
and anti-English.
This was bolstered by the impression among opponents of the bill,
that insufficient time was devoted to consideration of Scottish reform,
the introduction of which was disposed of within one hour late at
night.46 In light of this perceived neglect of Scottish legislation, oppo-
nents might represent the largely English cabinet as a crude, centralis-
ing force, indifferent to the Scottish aspects of the reform question.
When he was defeated by a reform candidate in the election for the
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Selkirk burghs in May 1831, James Johnston of Alva levelled a particu-
larly virulent and nationalistic blow at the Whig administration:
[…] even the Lord Advocate did not know; by his own confession, Minis-
ters had not confided to him what their intentions were; so that in effect
Scotland was to have laws made for her by Englishmen, who knew nothing
about the country. Was it to be endured, that we, countrymen of Bruce
and Wallace, should submit to receive laws from the descendants of those
men whom our heroic ancestors had beaten in the field; and that we were
to have their plan of government forced down our throats.47
The defence of the singularity of Scotland’s position necessitated inter-
pretations of the Scottish people for whom opponents of the reform bill
purported to be acting, and of the movement that was vociferously
demanding reform outside Parliament. One approach was to maintain
that the Scots remained peaceable and uninterested in political reform.
This, however, became increasingly difficult to sustain and the more
typical approach was to represent the reform agitation as temporary, the
result of peculiar circumstances rather than well-informed and
deeply-held convictions on the part of the Scottish people. Lord Gower
attributed the movement not to ‘the force of argument’ but rather to ‘a
concurrence of circumstances and from events which had taken place
on the Continent’ and expressed confidence in March 1831 that a reac-
tion would not be long in coming.48 Perhaps the most common explana-
tion for the agitation was to attribute it, as Sir George Warrender did, to
the ‘firebrand’ of the ministerial bill.49 Correspondents of the duke of
Buccleuch assured him that ‘if the mobility were let alone’ there would
be no reform meetings, and lamented and vilified the narrow and dan-
gerous tactics of government: ‘Excitement alone is the ministerial
weapon of offence or defence, and this in the end will work their own
ruin.’50
Opponents of the bill, like Lord Loughborough, also expressed the
conviction that support for the reform bill in Scotland came from the
‘distress which pervaded all classes’ and the belief that reform would
provide remedies for material grievances.51 One pamphlet written by ‘a
Freeholder and Landholder of Scotland’ suggested that the lower
orders would ever remain discontented with their lot and desire change.
This clamour should not be regarded as an expression of political
beliefs, but a call for material improvement: ‘what they desire is not a
change in government, but a change in their circumstances’.52 It was this
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interpretation of the motives of the lower orders that could move Sir
Charles Forbes in the Commons, and the duke of Buccleuch in the
Lords, to claim that reform petitions had been put in gin shops to be
signed.53 When potential subscribers asked what the benefits of reform
would be, Forbes claimed they were persuaded to sign by the answer
‘they would have whisky for nothing; that there would be no gaugers,
and that all would be quite free’.54 These sorts of petitions were worthless
when set next to the petitions against the bill from what he and others
considered as the true representatives of Scottish opinion and the watch-
dogs of the constitution, the freeholders in the counties.55 It was a
similar profound distrust of the people which saw Sir William Rae qualify
the image of them as peaceable in the opening debates: ‘He regretted
the extension of the franchise, because it was well-known that
Scotchmen seldom came together in a multitude without causing blood-
shed, or at least riot’.56 This view of the incapacity of the people, or at
least the lower orders, to engage in respectable politics, coloured the
responses of opponents of the bill to the various stages of the reform
crisis. Rae restated his position following a rash of election disturbances
in May 1831 and cited these as ‘proof of its correctness’, a sentiment sup-
ported by Clerk.57 Blackwood’s was triumphant that the much vilified Rae
had been vindicated and that, at the first opportunity, the people ‘broke
out into the very excesses which had been foretold by those who knew
them best’.58
The elections themselves also rendered the immediate political
context more problematic for those Scottish MPs who had opposed the
bill, and particularly for those who had voted for Gascoyne’s
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amendment. With a ministry now sure of carrying the principle of the
bill in the House of Commons, few Scottish MPs ventured to oppose the
reform bill in its entirety, instead seeking to minimise its impact by
amending the proposed redistribution of seats. Essentially, they now
styled themselves as ‘moderate reformers’ no longer opposing the prin-
ciple of reform itself, but only the theoretical provisions that would
upset the balance of a prescriptive constitution. Crucially, the approach
from prescription precluded only the kind of theoretical reform from
which the dangers of revolution might be feared. Those who opposed
the reform bills were thus able to argue that it was only this type of sweep-
ing reform that was anathema to them, while many, such as Sir George
Clerk, MP for the county of Edinburgh, could emphasise that they were
prepared to ‘alter and amend’.59 This altered mode of opposition was
more prevalent after the general election and had one principal politi-
cal aim—the protection of the landed interest from what Charles
Douglas, the MP for Lanarkshire, described as ‘a direct attack on the
agriculturalists’.60
If it was in their interests to attack the proposed plan of redistribution,
when the Scottish bill was placed next to the English measure
anti-reformers were presented with an issue that allowed them to make
stronger claims for the patriotic high ground. A prominent theme in
nearly all speeches by erstwhile anti-reformers after the general election
was that, in terms of the number of additional seats she was offered,
justice was not being done to Scotland. The liberal press was apt to
denounce the sham patriotism of these ‘grovelling and false-hearted
Scotsmen’ especially because many of those who clamoured for extra
seats had also voted for Gascoyne’s motion in April, which had ensured
that none of these might come from the English representation.61 The
arguments with which opponents of the bill supported this position
were, however, consistent with earlier approaches. Accepting the princi-
ple of the bill as a fait accompli, the progress of Scotland within the Union
was now mobilised as an argument for extra members, as it was by
Colonel Lindsay:
[…] this Bill did not give a fair proportion of Members to Scotland, con-
sidering the wealth and population of that country. The proportion had
long been settled, and being altered, as it was now proposed to be, the
Articles of Union were violated; while, at the same time, justice was not
done to Scotland.62
While the unreformed representation had been beyond the wit of man,
full of anomalies and not reducible to any theory, it had been perfect in
its practical results. It was this kind of argument which had been
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deployed to defend the existence of the nominal or rotten boroughs in
England. These, as well as providing the opportunities for the represen-
tation of imperial interests and for talented men of small fortune to
enter Parliament without a ruinous contest, also served to supplement
Scotland’s inadequate representation. Sir George Murray had premised
his support for Gascoyne’s amendment on his belief that ‘the number of
Scotchmen was greater now than it would be under the new system, for it
was well known that great numbers of Scotchmen sat for English bor-
oughs’.63 Indeed, the Lord Advocate himself was in the position of sitting
for Lord Fitzwilliam’s pocket borough of Malton until the general elec-
tion of 1831. The wholesale changes being made to a system that
achieved such advantageous results for Scotland could thus allow
Warrender, in January 1832, to claim that Scotland had an additional
right to extra members because of ‘the facility with which Scotch Gentle-
men had hitherto obtained seats in that House, through the medium of
close English boroughs’.64
Members who lamented the demolition of this practically perfect
system thus charged government with introducing a reform that was the-
oretical, yet did not apply this theory equally across the three kingdoms.
Sir George Murray made the case at length in calling for more seats to
represent the Scottish counties and demanding that in new-modelling
the representation ‘all parts of the empire ought to have been treated
fairly … According to the principles of the Bill, however, Scotland was
not fairly treated’.65 This patriotic argument was even used to attempt to
stimulate a popular reaction against the reform measure, and an Edin-
burgh bill poster from June 1832, Scotland’s Appeal to her Sons, addressed
itself ‘to all Scotsmen, whether Whigs or Tories, Reformers or Anti-Reformers’.
It claimed that the object of British government, prosecuted by any
party, had always been ‘to insult and degrade SCOTLAND to the situa-
tion of a CONQUERED PROVINCE’ and indicted the reform bill for
suggesting ‘that TWENTY-EIGHT ENGLISHMEN are equal in all
respects to FORTY-FOUR SCOTSMEN’. To redress this injustice it
exhorted all Scots to call meetings to petition for more seats and for the
same rules to be applied equitably to Scotland and England, and asked
‘because Scotland was cheated at the Union, does that afford any good
reason for her being ALWAYS cheated?’ The poster ended this patriotic
harangue by citing twelve lines from ‘Scots wha hae’.66
*
If there was thus no single or coherent ideological defence of the unre-
formed representation or assault on the proposed reform, the support-
ers of reform also deployed idiosyncratic arguments and appealed to the
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language of patriotism. Of all the political groupings of the early nine-
teenth century the Whigs had the best claim to be an organised party,
although this was true only in a partial sense. Even the appointment of
Wellington’s government in 1828 had not served to unite them and,
while they became more organised and coherent towards the end of
1830, they remained a broad church, comprehending different posi-
tions on parliamentary reform.67 The cabinet formed by earl Grey to
prosecute reform reflected this breadth, incorporating liberal Tories
and one ultra Tory in the duke of Richmond, as well as Whigs of differ-
ing ideological hues.68 D. C. Moore advanced sophisticated sociological
arguments for interpreting this mixed political elite’s espousal of reform
as an essentially conservative measure, a constitutional ‘cure’ designed
to maintain the steadily eroding power of the landed interest by creating
‘deference communities’ as parliamentary constituencies.69 As John Mil-
ton-Smith argued, however, such an approach tends to generalisation
and thus undervalues the complexity and flexibility of individual
approaches to the reform question, and the specific political context in
which the legislation was formed.70 The coalition lacked one coherent
justification for the measures it pursued, and was sustained and united
by the common belief that reform was a matter of expediency, if for
some it was also a matter of principle.71 For the Scottish Whigs, there
were two basic approaches to reform, which might be usefully defined as
‘old’ and ‘new’ Whig. These cannot be seen as distinct creeds, but rather
as broad critiques, which mingled with one another, as they did with
other ideologies, to produce idiosyncratic approaches to reform.
An old Whig approach to reform was certainly apparent, as we might
expect from a ministry headed by Grey, whose recent biographers have
portrayed him as ‘above all, a Whig aristocrat of the eighteenth century,
who lived through but never entirely accepted an age of rapid social and
political change’.72 Relying on much the same ideological inheritance,
old Whig ideas about parliamentary reform could appear similar to
more conservative critiques. In seeking to balance ‘interests’ and main-
tain the equilibrium of a tripartite constitution of king, Lords and
Commons, this critique was similarly averse to speculation and favoured
terms such as ‘amending’ or ‘restoring’.73 James Loch, MP for the Tain
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burghs after 1830, and more notorious as one of the architects of the
Sutherland clearances, is indicative of this old Whig approach to politi-
cal reform in Scotland. Loch was invited to submit a plan of reform to
the Whig government in December 1830, and the scheme he offered was
a clear reflection of old Whig ideas about political reform. His plan
began by suggesting that the guiding principle of any parliamentary
reform should be ‘the corrections of those anomalies and abuses which
the change of circumstances and the progress of some portions of the
Country, more than others, has produced in the state of the representa-
tion’. Interestingly, he sought a county franchise for Scotland based on
‘some Principle […] already existing in the Constitution of that Coun-
try’, pre-empting those who would oppose reform on the basis that it
destroyed Scotland’s semi-independent constitutional arrangements.74
As far as Loch was concerned, reform was about amending abuses, bal-
ancing different interests in a manner which maintained the influence
of those possessing landed wealth, and doing so in line with the constitu-
tion or at least the traditions and institutions of Scotland.
The plans of reform advocated by men such as Loch before the intro-
duction of the government’s bills had more than a passing similarity to
the kind of reform which opponents of those measures would come to
advocate during the course of 1831.75 Indeed, it is instructive as to the
common political assumptions of much of the Scottish elite that Loch
could, as early as December 1830, level criticisms against those chosen to
draft the Scottish legislation, which pre-empted most of the arguments
which would be levelled at Jeffrey in Parliament throughout 1831:
[…] now with all submission I must contend that no class of Men are less
capable of advising on a practicable Question affecting the interests of all
classes of the Country —they are theoretical in their views, exclusive in
their Society contemning all who differ from them in opinion holding by
far too cheap the general body of the Landed Proprs. of the Country […]
Their object is to have a measure that will create a more perfect state of
political condition than now exists. That I take it is not the object of Parlia-
mentary Reform, which ought to aim at no more than doing away with the
anomalies produced by time, and suiting your Institutions to such
changes.76
This critique of the Edinburgh Reviewers, and implicitly of new Whig
ideology, highlighted three main concerns about the approach to
reform pursued by the architects of the Scottish legislation, all of which
were superficially apparent in Cockburn’s Review article of October
1830. First, Loch argued that the Reviewers’ approach was not based on
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principles of amending and preserving the existing, prescriptive consti-
tution but was speculative. Cockburn had portrayed Scotland as lacking
any representation whatever: ‘there never has been, and while the exist-
ing system endures, there never can be, any thing resembling a real rep-
resentation in Scotland’.77 The existing system would, therefore, have to
be dismantled and a new one raised in its place. Second, by adopting the
theory of a uniform franchise, which was part of Cockburn’s plan, it
threatened to upset the delicate balance of interests, and particularly to
destroy landed influence in Scotland.78 Third, that it threatened to
ignore the peculiarities of Scottish society in a project aimed at blind
assimilation and ignored native opinion. Certainly, Cockburn had been
scathing of the calibre of Scottish MPs and his article had begun by sug-
gesting that it was impossible to see the elections in England ‘without
turning with sorrow and humiliation to Scotland’.79 Loch’s criticisms
were voiced by a large number of the Scottish political elite, both Whig
and Tory, throughout the reform crisis, and they provide a framework in
which to investigate new Whig ideology and its influence on reform in
Scotland.
New Whig ideas about reform owed a great deal to the Scottish tradi-
tion of conjectural history which argued that, while the past still pro-
vided a guide to actions, to it must be added sagacious conjectures with
respect to the future. It had also moved away from discussion about what
form of government was most meritorious, instead identifying com-
merce as the motor of society, and its maintenance as the ultimate aim of
political institutions.80 In practical political terms, this meant that, while
abstract innovation remained dangerous, wise legislation must pursue
the ‘gradual and prudent accommodation of established institutions to
the varying opinions, manners, and circumstances of mankind’.81 This
intellectual legacy was reinforced by personal relationships, which were
especially apparent in the group influenced by the teaching of Dugald
Stewart, professor of moral philosophy at Edinburgh University between
1785 and 1810. From this seat of learning Stewart taught an entire gener-
ation of Scottish and British politicians, including not only Cockburn
and Jeffrey, but other figures prominent during the reform crisis such as
Henry Brougham, Lord Palmerston and James Mill.82 Responsibility for
the Scottish reform measure devolved on two of Stewart’s erstwhile stu-
dents, Francis Jeffrey and Henry Cockburn, who acted in collaboration
with key members of the Scottish political elite, most notably the MP for
the Ayr burghs, Thomas Kennedy. What was marked in the opening
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debates was the relatively small number of speakers who spoke in
support of the Scottish measure. Jeffrey’s ideological defence of the bill
was supplemented, not by speeches from MPs in Scottish seats, but those
from Daniel O’Connell, MP for county Clare, and Joseph Hume, the
Scottish radical who sat for Middlesex.83 The situation improved after
the general election, which afforded government two members who
were passionate advocates of the bill and were prepared to defend it at
length—William Gillon, MP for the Linlithgow burghs, and Robert Fer-
guson of Raith, MP for the Kirkcaldy burghs.84 Older hands were also
pitching in more consistently by this point, with Charles Grant, the Presi-
dent of the Board of Control and county MP for Inverness, and Sir James
Mackintosh, sitting for Knaresborough, adding their weight to the gov-
ernment’s case.85
In the opening debates, however, the Lord Advocate was largely left to
his own devices. In presenting and defending the measure, the influ-
ence of conjectural history was most apparent in the powerful coun-
ter-argument made against the idea that Scotland’s prosperity and
improvement since 1707 rendered any innovation in her representation
a dangerous pursuit. Jeffrey delivered a coherent attack on this notion in
his speech during the debate on the introduction of reform in March
1831. He began by highlighting the high level of ‘wealth, splendor, and
cultivation’ that England had achieved under the Tudors and Stuarts.
This was evidence of the fact that ‘for nations to attain a great measure of
prosperity and an infinite measure of wealth, very little political freedom
was necessary’.86 Anti-reformers, according to Jeffrey, were peddling a
fallacious argument which, in simply viewing the practical existence of
prosperity and civilisation as proof positive of the adequacy of political
arrangements, left no room for progress and utterly misrepresented the
relationship between liberty and commercial prosperity. By invoking the
examples of the Italian republics and the German trading towns of the
middle ages, he sought to demonstrate the general principle, that it was
commercial prosperity itself that created the desire for and necessity of
political reform. Commercial growth was the motor of society, creating
leisure time for education and cultivation, a process that imparted to
increasing numbers in society ‘a sense of dignity and independence,
which led at once to the assertion of political power and importance’. By
this argument ‘liberty was the daughter, not the mother of riches’.87 It
was this approach, which relied heavily on the tenets of conjectural
history, which allowed Jeffrey to derive a general theory of political
reform: ‘The fact was deducible from principles which admitted of no
question, that as long as nations continue crescent and progressive in
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wealth they constantly and successively outgrow the dimensions of their
political institutions.’88
The proof that reform was needed was simply the existence of reason-
able and lasting discontent among those beneficiaries of commercial
growth who had gained not only wealth but respectability and intelli-
gence, and a concomitant right to claim to be represented. This reason-
able discontent was certainly apparent to Jeffrey in the
extra-parliamentary movement demanding reform, and the remedy lay
in the enfranchisement of the middle classes through the medium of the
ten-pound franchise.89 The Scottish Whigs consistently identified a
respectable middle class, whose enfranchisement was justified on
grounds of expediency as well as principle. In contradistinction to this
class, whose virtues and intelligence rendered them worthy of represen-
tation but whose exclusion from the constitution made them discon-
tented, he described another:
[…] of far more desperate, and dangerous individuals—persons […] who
utterly distrust and despise all the institutions of the country; who hate all
law and authority, and aim directly, and with little disguise or equivoca-
tion, at the destruction of all property, and the abolition of all dignities.90
The great danger to be apprehended from resistance to reform was that
the middle classes, if their claims were denied, would come to side with
this dangerous faction with fatal consequences. Reformers also looked to
the French Revolution and drew political lessons from it; their conclu-
sions were, however, different from those of anti-reformers. James
Abercromby was clear that avoidance of a similar fate to that of France’s
ancien regime depended upon the government passing a significant mea-
sure of reform that might ‘unite such a large portion of the people, as to
give us a fair chance of avoiding violence’.91 If the bill miscarried, and par-
ticularly if it did so by the agency of the House of Lords, he was certain that
the people would apply lessons learned from the French as well:
If the Lords are rebellious, the people will not bear it, & they will
denounce the Lds as the greatest of all national grievances. In this they will
be encouraged by the example of France, where a hereditary Peerage is at
a great discount. With such an example before their eyes it will be very dif-
ficult to save the Lords, & they may settle their own fate by being violent.92
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In applying these principles to the Scottish representation, Jeffrey and
other reformers certainly made no secret of the fact that innovative
reform was what was required and, in September 1831, he and Sir James
Mackintosh both took in the broad sweep of British history to defend a
total change in Scotland’s political arrangements. It was apparent to all
that Scotland had advanced rapidly in wealth, population and education
since 1707. Her political arrangements had also been fixed at the Union,
and both Jeffrey and Mackintosh painted a bleak picture of seven-
teenth-century Scotland to demonstrate that this progress had been
achieved, according to the earl of Rosebery ‘not in consequence of its
Representative system but in spite of it’.93 Mackintosh asserted during
the debate in September 1831:
From whatever period the history of Scotland was looked at, from the time
of the Union of the Crowns to the Union of the kingdoms, it was found
that it had the same system of Representation it had up to the present day.
Yet under that Parliamentary Constitution, and that system of Representa-
tion, Scotland became the scene of bloodshed—the theatre of atrocious
crime—of cruel religious and civil wars, and of every horror that could
barbarize a nation.94
Jeffrey similarly sought to defuse the argument that the same might be
said of England by pointing to Scotland’s backward state. In the seven-
teenth century her people were only motivated by religion and ‘a
gloomy fanaticism […] and while they suffered political oppressions
unresisted, drew their swords at once for a scattered remnant and a
broken covenant’. Scotland could therefore take no constructive part in
‘the great outbreak and overflow of English liberty’.95
Scotland’s subsequent rapid advance was thus attributable to the posi-
tive results of the Union rather than to ‘its Parliamentary Constitution,
or to its Representative system’. While this was most apparent in the com-
mercial benefits of the Union, both Jeffrey and Mackintosh were pre-
pared to give some credit for the improvement of the population and
the political elite to the example set by free English institutions and
political culture. This was, however, no substitute for direct access to the
benefits of a free constitution, and Jeffrey stressed that he was in no way
defending notions of ‘virtual representation’ when he asserted that
‘Scotland had derived from England, not merely the benefit of greater
liberality of ideas, but greater knowledge of political rights, and more
respect for political duties’.96 Jeffrey continued his analysis by pointing
out that for the first fifty years of the Union, Scotland claimed no politi-
cal rights and expressed no national feeling save over religion. This he
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attributed to ‘a state of ignorance which the advantages of a rapidly
increasing trade, and a more extended intercourse with other countries,
have now so thoroughly dispelled’.97
Where there was division apparent in the arguments of Scottish
reformers, it appeared over this attribution of Scotland’s prosperity to
the advantages of the Union. Some who supported the bill, approached
the arguments of their opponents by rejecting Jeffrey and Mackintosh’s
approach and grounding their interpretation of Scottish progress in the
specific institutions secured by the Union, rather than in that union
itself and the benefits of English example. Andrew Johnstone, MP for
the East Fife burghs, noted the prevalence of the argument ‘that Scot-
land derived the chief of her present advantages, both in wealth and
other respects, from the benefits which were conferred on her since her
union with England’ but argued that such benefits were ‘chiefly the
result of her own industry’. Such advantages had important origins in
‘the chief of her popular institutions—namely, her Church’, which had
most certainly not arisen from the connection with England.98 A pam-
phlet in support of the bill widened this praise of Scottish institutions,
and highlighted not only a liberal and enlightened clergy, but also Scot-
land’s legal and educational systems, and her poor law, ‘things indige-
nous to our soil’, as that ‘to which Scotland, in reality, owes her
prosperity’.99 While the author acknowledged the manifest benefits of
the Union ‘to both kingdoms’, he took issue with Jeffrey’s gloomy por-
trait of pre-1707 Scotland, which had in fact struggled since the Romans
‘for the sacred cause of her religion, her liberties and her independ-
ence’.100
All reformers argued, however, that in 1831 Scotland could boast an
ever-increasing class of propertied, respectable and intelligent citizens
who still laboured under the manifold disadvantages of a feudal system
of representation that had been petrified in 1707. The reform argument
was one for the completion of the Union, by granting Scotland access to
the free institutions and representation that had been denied to her in
1707. Disagreement among reformers, as is suggested by Loch’s com-
ments, was over how far this process should proceed. For Jeffrey and
Mackintosh there were no indigenous political and libertarian tradi-
tions to which they might appeal, and Mackintosh claimed that while it
was fair to describe the English measure as ‘a restoration of ancient prin-
ciples’ the same simply could not be true of Scotland. It was a mockery to
suggest that the Scottish bill ‘restored rights they had never possessed,
and renewed a Constitution which they never enjoyed’.101 Reform in
Scotland would necessarily involve the wholesale replacement of the
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existing feudal arrangements. Jeffrey made no secret of this aim when he
introduced the second bill to the Commons, and gave a radical state-
ment of intent that was anathema to many more conservative members:
He would then at once declare that the object of the Bill was not to take
away any part of the system, but to take down the whole of it, to take it
down altogether, for the whole principle of it was bad. He gloried in
making the avowal that no shred or rag, no jot or tittle of it was to be left.102
In the light of this rather radical statement, perhaps the aspect of Loch’s
critique which needs most detailed consideration is that which has been
repeated by historians, that in remodelling the representation the Scot-
tish Whigs were aiming at assimilation.103 It is clear that they did see the
reform act as the emancipation of Scotland from a native feudal political
system, or as Cockburn more colourfully put it: ‘The last links of the
Scotch feudal chain dropping off under the hammers that one may dis-
tinctly hear erecting the first Hustings our country ever saw!’104 Jeffrey’s
private statements echoed the prejudices of many eighteenth-century
English politicians against the tenor of Scottish politics. He described
native politics as ‘Scotch dirt’ and became increasingly annoyed with the
constant jobbing of ‘our hungry Scotch Whigs’.105 To Jeffrey, the Augean
stables of Scottish corruption could be cleansed only by direct access to
rejuvenated English liberties. The measures were, however, patriotically
presented as amending an ‘ungenerous’ union, which had been charac-
terised by ‘the stronger party imposing conditions that seemed not equi-
table on the weaker’.106 This was the approach adopted by other Scottish
reformers and Robert Ferguson demonstrated his unionist-nationalism
when he addressed the electors of the county of Haddington in May
1831:
He thought this was a cause in which Scotsmen would feel proud to come
forward—it was to put them on level with England—it was to place them
on a political footing they never before had. He hailed the measure as the
real union of Scotland with England—he considered the former union as
a union of humility.107
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Subsequent historians, partly on the basis of Cockburn’s published
works, have tended to represent the Scottish Whigs as out-and-out
assimilationists.108 Michael Fry writes of Cockburn ‘at every point where
he could exert a direct personal influence, he actually wanted to make
Scotland as much like England as possible’.109 William Ferguson also
highlighted sloppy drafting and prejudices against Scottish civil law as
the causes of deficiencies in the bill.110 Doubtless mistakes were made,
the atmosphere of crisis, the lack of time devoted to the Scottish bill, and
Jeffrey and Cockburn’s nature as brilliant criminal, rather than civil,
lawyers all contributing. What is not apparent in Cockburn’s published
work is that many of the mistakes were due to pressure from a cabinet
intent on making the three bills as similar as possible, and beset by the
problems of legislating for the multiple union.111 Cockburn’s largely ret-
rospective analysis has tended to belie the fact that even the bill’s most
enthusiastic sponsors were actuated by a desire to legislate sympatheti-
cally for Scottish peculiarities.
The limits of the Scottish Whigs’ faith in assimilation are most appar-
ent in their private correspondence. Jeffrey wrote from London and was
time and time again compelled to conform to cabinet expectations, no
matter how incompatible they may have been with Scottish law or institu-
tions. To an extent, Jeffrey’s correspondence with Cockburn supports
the conclusions about the overbearing influence of an English cabinet
voiced by some Scottish opponents of the bill. The tone was set during
the consideration of the first draft of the bill and Jeffrey wrote in Febru-
ary 1831: ‘The Cabinet […] smashed all the mechanism of our Scotch bill
yesterday, in an inhuman manner; from a peremptory and inflexible res-
olution to make it conformable to what they have settled for England’.112
Jeffrey’s complaint was about the cabinet abolishing the review jurisdic-
tion of the Court of Session, which had been reviewing Freeholder quali-
fications since 1743. Cockburn was still livid at Lord Althorp’s apparent
acceptance of bad advice on this aspect of reform in April 1832, which
he felt constituted ‘the wanton introduction of glaring blots, the bad
working of which will hereafter be ascribed to the reform itself and not
to any defect in it’.113 In this prediction he was correct, and the eventual
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machinery of courts of sheriffs and substitutes was widely criticised after
1832.114
If they were careful to try to urge the impropriety of some English
measures as regarded Scots law, the same was true of their attitude to
Scottish institutions. In terms of assimilation, some issues could prove
divisive, as did the issue of whether to allow Scottish clergymen to claim
the vote on their benefices. The press abounded with angry letters
about it and the desire to avoid the Erastianism of the English church
and maintain the idea of ‘two kingdoms’ was expressed from many
quarters.115 The issue was raised in the House of Commons by the
presentation of a petition from the Presbytery of Dunblane in April
1831, which asked that ministers of the Church of Scotland be given the
vote in any reform measure.116 Parliamentary debate was long delayed,
however, and not until the committee stage did the pro-reform Andrew
Johnstone, a long-serving elder in the Church, move that no member
of the clergy, of any church in Scotland, be allowed to vote on the
qualification of their benefice. He made the motion ‘to preserve her
institutions […] and to preserve that peculiar character which
belonged to the Church and people of Scotland’.117 Johnstone cited the
Dunblane petition as proof that ‘churchmen, both in ancient and
modern times, had been and were desirous of political power in
Scotland’ and portrayed the enfranchisement of ministers as the
equivalent of the imposition of lay patronage in 1712.118 As far as he was
concerned, the church ought to be separate from the state, and giving
political power to the clergy would destroy their character and
respectability—they must therefore be saved from ‘the importunities of
patrons, from the solicitations of electors, or from any unhallowed
conflicts (which God forbid should ever take place) in regard to
sectarian differences’.119 The debate that followed cut across party lines,
and Johnstone was opposed by Althorp, Murray and Warrender and
supported by a handful of English members.120 From a distance,
Cockburn also supported Johnstone, and subsequently noted: ‘All right
thinking men were for disqualifying Scotch clergymen from voting
merely because it was better for them not to be seduced into politicks.
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But it was not English; & this, as on too many other occasions, was held
conclusive.’121
On this particular issue, there were also differences between the law
officers. Jeffrey himself was for enfranchising the clergy, largely on the
grounds that it was inconsistent to allow English and Irish clerics to vote
and not Scots. This idea also received the support of Roderick Macleod,
MP for Sutherland, who considered the issue in a letter to James Loch,
and came out explicitly in favour of a measure ‘which assimilates as
much as possible the representation of Scotland to that of England’.122
These national questions cut across positions taken among the political
elite on the more general question of reform.
Exasperation and frustration with the fiats and interference of an
assimilationist cabinet lasted for the entire duration of the crisis, flaring
up again in June 1832 with the attempt to establish a heritable property
qualification for Scottish burgh MPs. Jeffrey, on whose behalf an
Edinburgh election canvas had begun, absolutely refused to introduce
the clause, and was joined in this resolution by all of the pro-reform
Scottish members, leaving it to Althorp to introduce it himself. Jeffrey
made it clear that he opposed the clause because it would disqualify men
with wealth gained through commerce from standing, but the language
used was also that of resisting pressures for conformity with the English
measure: ‘I scarcely expect to succeed in this not being English.’123
Fearing too that even the immense unpopularity of the amendment in
Scotland would not change the government’s mind, he urged
Cockburn: ‘If you could show any solid distinction between Scotland
and the rest of the Empire to justify the exemption it might still be
listened to. But to say the truth, there is on this particular no solid
distinction.’124
Resistance to assimilation was a genuine response to perceived threats
to Scottish institutions, but it could also be exploited in the attempt to
frame legislation that accorded more with Scottish ‘new’ Whig princi-
ples. In this instance, Jeffrey sought to stop the Scottish representation
from being restricted to the landed aristocracy, and eagerly sought a pre-
cedent or justification within Scotland. He was supported by public
opinion and, in Edinburgh, reformers held a meeting to oppose the
clause, and J. A. Murray more pointedly denounced the assimilationist
tendencies of the government:
What was the real difficulty they had to contend against? Was it not the
feelings and prejudices of English members in favour of every thing that
was English. They did not know much about Scotland, and it was not to be
expected that they would regard opinions in Scotland so much as their
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own. They conceived that every thing established in England was right;
and that it would be a boon to give Scotland the same as they had them-
selves.125
This controversy surrounding the property qualification neatly illus-
trates the complicated relationship between events in Parliament and
the popular movement for reform in Scotland. While there is some justi-
fication for Cockburn’s subsequent claim that the Whigs ‘everywhere
put themselves at the head of the people’ the interactions between
reformers in Parliament and the movement outside were far more com-
plicated.126 In particular, the Whig government took a rather ambiguous
position on the Political Unions.127 This ambiguity was expressed by
Jeffrey, who wrote to Holland in January 1832 and explained that the
Unions had ‘contributed greatly to preserve peace and good order’,
though he remained wary that: ‘If the measure were to misgive, they
would be engines of the most frightful efficacy’.128 Within this relation-
ship the Political Unions could exercise a degree of influence on policy
and, indeed, individual MPs and radicals might use a general fear of
these bodies as leverage with which to further their own objectives.129
The Political Unions in Scotland greeted the announcement of the qual-
ification clause with a petitioning campaign and condemnations of this
‘most extravagant insult to the people of Scotland.’130 It was this context
that allowed Jeffrey to convince Althorp to drop the clause, which was
done immediately after the presentation of petitions against it from the
Glasgow, Edinburgh and Renfrewshire Political Unions.131
Perhaps the most critical question that raised the issue of Scotland’s
position within Britain was how many extra seats Scotland should
receive. With anti-reformers mounting a very vocal challenge for extra
seats after the elections of 1831, it became a focal point of patriotic
debate. On this point the Edinburgh lawyers were of a mind with the
likes of Rae, Clerk, and Warrender, although they would certainly have
apportioned any extra seats differently. Jeffrey made numerous repre-
sentations to the cabinet that Scotland required extra seats, both to
placate opposition and to do justice to her increased wealth and popula-
tion. The cabinet, and Althorp in particular, resisted such appeals on the
basis of the measure’s unpopularity with English MPs and because
it would afford O’Connell and Irish opinion an argument for more
seats. Facing a strong challenge to redistribution proposals from
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anti-reformers, the need to get seats from government for the represen-
tation of towns and cities increasingly became a priority of the Scottish
Whigs. In May 1831, Jeffrey requested extra seats for both towns and
populous Scottish counties, and he based his request on exactly the
same argument by which opponents of the bill would demand extra
seats. In comparison to the redistribution in England and the granting
of extra seats even to her tiniest counties, justice was not being done to
Scotland by the principles of population and wealth that Lord John
Russell had claimed as the guide for the reform legislation.132 Jeffrey’s
approach could at times become nationalistic, even to the point of using
crude national stereotypes in his agitated correspondence with
Cockburn. For example, when Wales was given extra representation he
railed: ‘The concession to the cheese-eating, goaty, Principality of Wales,
in the Committee, strengthens our claim considerably; and I think the
English nationality, leading them to keep all their spare members to
themselves, is visibly abated.’133
The frustration was directed again at the essentially English nature of
the reform. The obstacle identified is not, in this case, an authoritarian
and assimilationist cabinet, but a more generally defined English nation-
alism, which was reluctant to augment the representation of Scotland
and particularly Ireland at the expense of the English centre. This argu-
ment was even more patriotically stated in the published letter to earl
Grey mentioned above, which supported the reform bill, but which
encouraged the government to treat Britain as a single entity, and seize
upon reform as an opportunity to make amends for the imperfect
Union of 1707. According to its author, the objectives of reform were:
[…] to restore privileges which have been unduly destroyed; to legislate
for the united kingdom as a whole, and not as frittered into parts; to restore
to Scotland that representation which her actual wealth, population,
enterprise and intelligence demand, and which is especially due, from the
sacrifice of rights wrested from her at the Union.134
Such issues highlight the inadequacy of the term ‘assimilation’ when
applied to Scottish political elites during the reform crisis. Certainly,
there were out-and-out assimilationists who argued for a single bill for
the three kingdoms and complete uniformity of provision, but these
were few. In reality, the consideration of Scotland’s position within
Britain was rarely that simple, and there were significant differences
between the views of reformers. They all argued for a level of political
assimilation ‘to bring Scotland within the action of the constitution’, but
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there were clearly limits to this. Rendering Scottish political institutions
compatible with the progress of commercial society, rather than making
them conform to an English model, was the purpose of the bill’s archi-
tects. This could certainly in part be achieved with reference to English
liberties, but ought not to be pursued without due regard for Scottish
institutions and laws. Over this point the Whig lawyers came into
repeated conflict with the cabinet, and could level against it arguments
which were similar to those employed by opponents of the bill. Some-
thing that was common to all reformers was that when Scots believed
that they were being denied equal access to English liberties, as with
their frequent calls for extra seats, what Kidd calls ‘a traditional Scottish
chauvinism’ could emerge.135
*
There was therefore no single or coherent ideological defence of the
unreformed representation or assault on the proposed reform. Nearly
two years of unprecedented political excitement both in and outside
Parliament certainly had a considerable impact on how members spoke
of the Scottish representation. J. C. D. Clark’s high political interpreta-
tion, which suggested that notions of an immutable Protestant constitu-
tion collapsed quickly under the force of events between 1829 and 1832,
is certainly applicable to the Scottish context.136 The provisions of the
Union of 1707, which had been taken to define her position within this
constitution, were rarely defended as inviolable, although anti-reform
arguments could still emphasise the singularity of Scotland’s constitu-
tional position. This separateness was portrayed as positive, both in
explaining Scotland’s phenomenal commercial progress since 1707 and
in delivering defences of the British representative system as an inte-
grated whole. Certainly, there was a large degree of constitutionality to
this approach, but with the emphasis on the results of this anom-
aly-ridden constitution, which had proved itself ideally suited to all the
practical needs of the people and the nation’s progress. Indeed, the
notion of Scottish singularity could be carried to the extent of suggest-
ing that Scotland had a separate constitution, and Colonel Lindsay,
referring to the successful passage of the English measure through the
Commons, lamented that the ‘Constitution of England’ had been
ejected, and that: ‘He must expect that the same fate would attend the
Constitution of Scotland.’137 In defence of this constitution, which repre-
sented the wisdom of generations, the government’s reform measures,
particularly as they applied to Scotland, were represented as danger-
ously speculative. Such reform would destroy the delicate balance of
interests preserved by the old system and ensure the utter domination of
the landed interest by the new ten-pound voters.
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Interpretations of reform that rest on the notion of a crisis in elite pol-
itics tend to obscure the extent to which arguments used by elites had to
be modified in the light of extra-parliamentary realities. The large, vocal
and sustained agitation outside of Parliament could not be effectively
dismissed as an effusion of popular feeling that would quickly disappear
if resisted. In light of the seeming inevitability of reform, opponents of
the bills, after the general election of 1831, sought to re-brand them-
selves as moderate but patriotic reformers who sought justice for Scot-
land within the new system. They had lost the argument over the
necessity of Scottish reform. The reform debates and the dynamic
context in which they were held thus present us with a complex picture
of discourses in transition. Certainly, self-interest and political expedi-
ency help to explain the positions taken and arguments employed by
Scottish MPs who opposed the reform legislation. We must also recog-
nise, however, that, to MPs who had consistently defended the prescrip-
tive constitution against the dangers of theory and speculation, the
reform bills and the movement that supported them necessitated a
reformulation of ideas.
Similarly, Cockburn’s narrative, delivered in his several published
works, does not reflect the opinions of all Scottish Whigs. The architects
of Scottish reform approached the issue with an idiosyncratic critique.
In the pages of the Edinburgh Review and through the various movements
that had developed during the 1820s to question Scottish institutions
and society, they had come to regard the entirety of Scottish representa-
tion as corrupt and essentially feudal. While these political arrange-
ments had not impeded Scotland’s progress since the Union, the links
between liberty and commercial society convinced Cockburn and
Jeffrey that it was imperative for Scotland to enlarge her political institu-
tions if this progress was to be maintained. This was no blind assimila-
tion, however, and Jeffrey and Cockburn were both concerned that
Scottish reform should be prosecuted with due sensitivity to Scottish law
and institutions. Their ultimate goal of modernisation through the
maintenance of commercial society certainly encouraged some emula-
tion of English practices, but this ought to be seen as accommodation
rather than assimilation.138 Far from everything after the ten-pound
franchise being, as Cockburn claimed, ‘mere detail and machinery’ the
Scottish Whigs constantly came into conflict with a cabinet for whom
Scottish reform did not constitute a priority, and the Scottish landed
interest which mounted a strong rearguard action to defend its posi-
tion.139 This approach necessitated what many could denounce as a ‘rad-
ical’ approach to Scottish reform, which was at odds with the common
political culture of Scottish elites. If Whigs were united in recognising
the expediency of reform, Loch’s bitter denunciation of Jeffrey and
Cockburn and the proximity of his arguments to those of the opponents
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of the bill, suggest that a nuanced approach to the discourses of reform
is required. In many important aspects, particularly his insistence that
reform ought to maintain the landed interest and be pursued in line
with Scotland’s constitution and existing institutions, he approached
the arguments of those who opposed the bill. Indeed, by the end of
1831, opponents of the bill were advocating in Parliament just the kind
of reform that Loch had in mind in December 1830.
The reform debate in Scotland necessitated a questioning of many
fundamental aspects of Scottish society and, among political elites, of
the central tenets of their political convictions. Dividing MPs into ‘re-
formers’ and ‘anti-reformers’ insufficiently describes a fluid context in
which the subject of discussion shifted: from debating whether there
ought to be a reform at all, MPs came to discuss what manner and degree
of reform was acceptable. So too did all MPs try to present themselves as
lovers of their country, and no group achieved a monopoly on the lan-
guage of patriotism. This contest was sharpened by the nature of the leg-
islation as renegotiating Scotland’s position within the Union. As the
government struggled to legislate effectively for England and Wales,
Ireland and Scotland, national questions emerged which could cut
across positions taken by MPs on other aspects of the reform question.
While the broad outlines of different positions are identifiable, the strik-
ing feature of the debate was its ability to elicit idiosyncratic responses to
reform.
1 3 0 G O R D O N P E N T L A N D
